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**21 JUL 1947**

**MID 907**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:**

**SUBJECT: Revision of the Charters of the JIC and the JIS**

1. With reference to your memorandum dated 11 July 1947, subject as above, the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, cannot concur with the proposed revision enclosed thereto, but reaffirms the recommendation made in JCS 1569/4. The following comments are in support of this viewpoint:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling their function of war and defense planning must control the intelligence agency or agencies which support this function. The CIG, despite the military representation assigned therein, is not within the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and therefore cannot, and should not be expected, to fulfill a staff function for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. The JIC, in common with all committees, frequently is confronted by a wide divergence of opinion among its members. The services of an intelligence staff are required for the expeditious resolution of these differences. Without the services of a staff, the JIC would be confronted by a situation wherein the separate agencies drafting war plans or war plans estimates would apply direct to the intelligence services, with the resultant danger that the divergence of opinion reflected in the separate intelligence responses might be reconciled by working groups not primarily concerned with intelligence.

c. The priorities assigned to estimates requested of the JIC are set by the Joint Staff Planners -- which priorities the JIC considers its foremost obligation. Any system whereby such priorities might be overshadowed by requests from another and possibly senior source, would unnecessarily hinder the work of the Joint Staff Planners. For this reason also, the Joint Intelligence Staff should be under the direct control of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

d. Inasmuch as each individual member of the JIC is responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, it is considered neither necessary nor advisable to restrict a subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the policies and objectives enunciated by the National Intelligence Authority.

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e. While there is no objection to the Director of Central Intelligence (provided he is a member of the armed forces) sitting as an observer at meetings of the JIC, it is believed that inasmuch as most meetings are concerned with military problems there is no need for the institution of such a procedure.

f. The function of the Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is an administrative one. To make an exception in the case of the Secretary, JIC, by requiring him "to handle those matters which are considered inappropriate to the CIG" is unsound.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

LAURIN L. WILLIAMS  
Colonel, GSC  
Executive

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